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Chapter 1. 
An overview of the intersection between contemporary cognitive science, 
intersubjectivity and phenomenology. 
This introduction will survey the contemporary intersection between phenomenology and 
cognitive science in theory of mind discussions concerning intersubjectivity.  The first 
section gives a characterisation of classical cognitivism and its theory of social cognition, 
theory theory, and a brief characterisation of simulation theory, which was put forward 
to challenge theory theory. The second section is a detailed outline of the rise of the 
embodiment movement and its relation to phenomenology. I will also discuss the related 
concepts of enaction and embededdness. I then move to highlight that the embodiment 
movement has given rise to two theories of embodiment – embodied simulation and 
interaction theory. Finally I will briefly touch on the phenomenological methodological 
innovations that Gallagher and other interaction theorists suggest before moving on to 
the methods and aims of my own thesis.  
For some time in theory of mind philosophy the dominant model was what’s termed 
classical cognitivism, which  
“holds that our cognitive capacities should be understood in terms of 
computational procedures operating on symbolic, internal mental states, and 
thus, cognitive science should be focused on studying these internal states and 
processes…  Cognitivism has been the dominant view in psychology and 
philosophy of mind since the 1950s. In fact, it has been so dominant that some 
have called it the only game in town.”1    
Classical cognitivism has been mired by two problems – the first is the explanatory gap. 
In  the empirical tradition this problem was brought to light by an influential article by 
Thomas Nagel which highlighted that, in regards to psychology, the physical/ objective 
                                                          
1 Spaulding, S (2012). “Introduction to debates on Social Cognition.” Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Vol. 11. Pg. 
432. 
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model of explanation, which relies on the adoption of a third person perspective on 
phenomena, fails to provide an adequate account of what it’s like to have experience 
from a first person perspective. Nagel argued that if  
“physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must themselves 
be given a physicalist account. But when we examine their subjective character it 
seems that such a result is impossible. The reason is that every subjective 
phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems 
inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view.”2 
The second problem which has mired classical cognitivism is the problem of other minds, 
which asks how is it we can justify our belief that people have minds very much like our 
own.3 For classical cognitivism the specific problem has been how we come to have 
knowledge of what other people are thinking, what their intentions are, and can predict 
their behaviour, as we seem often to be able to do. As an attempt to resolve the problem 
of other minds classical cognitivism has recently moved towards discussions of social 
cognition. 
Classical cognitivism put forward, as a solution to the problem of other minds, a theory 
of social cognition - theory theory.  
Theory theorists argue that we explain and predict behaviour by employing folk 
psychological theories about how mental states inform behaviour. With our folk 
psychological theories, we infer from a target’s behaviour what his or her mental 
states probably are. And from these inferences, plus the psychological principles 
in the theory connecting mental states to behavior, we predict the target’s 
                                                          
2 Nagel, T (1974). “What is it like to be a bat?” Reprinted in D. Dennett and R. Hofstadter (Eds) The Mind’s I. Penguin Books: 
Somerset. Pg 393.  
3 Hyslop, A (2010). "Other Minds", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.) Accessed 
from plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/other-minds/>. Section 1. 
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behaviour (Carruthers and Smith 1996; Davies and Stone 1995a; Gopnik and 
Wellman 1992; Nichols and Stich 2003).”4  
For the last two decades the major debate has been between theory theory and 
simulation theory.  
Simulation theorists, in contrast, argue that we explain and predict others behaviour by 
using our own minds as a model and “putting ourselves in another’s shoes”. That is, by 
imagining what our mental states would be and how we would behave if we were in the 
others situation. More specifically, we simulate what the others mental states could have 
been to cause the observed behaviour, then we use the simulated mental states, pretend 
beliefs and pretend desires, as input, run them through our own decision-making 
mechanism. We then take the resulting conclusion and attribute it to the other person.5  
Spaulding notes that this debate has stalled in the past few years and that progress has 
been limited to articulating various hybrid simulation theory – theory theory accounts.  
In between this opposition, and in response to the tension created by the explanatory 
gap, a third term has recently been introduced - embodiment. In an influential work 
from 1991 Rosch et. al. argued that a deep circularity ensues as a result of the 
interdependencies between the cognitivist scientists views about cognition and their 
existence as an embodied being embedded in a life-world of social and cultural 
practices.6  
They quote Dennett who stated at the time that every cognitivist theory currently 
defended or envisaged is a theory of the subpersonal level. Dennett goes on to say that 
it is not at all clear how a psychological theory - as distinct from a philosophical theory - 
could fail to be a subpersonal theory and as such completely inaccessible to conscious 
experience. They note that for Dennett, our conscious self-understanding presupposes 
notions such as believing, desiring, and knowing but a priori cannot explain them. For 
                                                          
4 Spaulding, S. (2012) “Introduction to debates on Social Cognition.” Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Vol. 11. Pg. 
432. 
5 Ibid Pg. 433. 
6 Rosch, E, Varela, F J &Thompson, E (1991). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Kindle Edition. 
Section: “The theme of this book”. Kindle location 240. 
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Dennett and many cognitive scientists, if the study of mind is to be rigorous and 
scientific, it cannot be bound to explanations in terms of features essential to our 
conscious self-understanding. Rosch et. al. argue this has the effect of deepening of the 
tension between cognitive science and conscious experience.7 
Although the scientific, third person perspective may be adequate for other forms of 
science when “it is cognition or mind that is being examined, the dismissal of experience 
becomes untenable, even paradoxical.”8 Thus, in order to dissolve this perceived tension 
the embodiment movement returned to phenomenology. They note that 
“phenomenology was and still is the philosophy of human experience, the only extant 
edifice of thought that addresses these issues head-on.”9 
Rosch et. al., in order to resolve this tension, return to the work of phenomenologists 
such as Husserl, Merleau Ponty and Heidegger. The last two phenomenologists feature 
more prominently than Husserl. For Rosch et. al. Husserl was caught in his attempt to 
resolve the tension between science and the life-world and the “peculiar contortion” 
prescribed by the epoche fails to fully extricate itself from the relation between the two; 
represents the impossibility of such a project. They argue that “Husserl's turn toward 
experience and "the things themselves" was entirely theoretical, or, to make the point 
the other way around, it completely lacked any pragmatic dimension. It is hardly 
surprising, therefore, that it could not overcome the rift between science and 
experience...”10 They note that Merleau Ponty and Heidegger stress the pragmatic, 
embodied context of human cognition.  
Although Rosch et. al. seem to favour the latter phenomenologists in the above quote 
there is no doubt as to the worth of Husserl’s original analysis of the relation between 
the body and intersubjectivity in contemporary discussions of social cognition. Because 
Husserl is a founding figurehead for the phenomenological movement, in my thesis I will 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. Kindle location 250. 
9 Ibid. Section: “The breakdown of phenomenology.” Kindle location 329. 
10 Ibid. Kindle location 319 – 322. 
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be paying special attention to his work. Many accounts of Husserl’s theory of 
intersubjectivity begin by countering the claim that Husserl’s phenomenology is 
inherently solipsistic due to the nature of the reductions and the sphere of immanent 
experience they are designed to turn us towards.  
Foreseeing the problem of other minds Husserl acknowledges that other peoples 
experience is not given as identical to experience within the “primordial” sphere of our 
own self experience. If it was we would not be able to distinguish between our 
experience and the experience another person has.11 However, for Husserl other people 
are pivotal in establishing two fundamental types of experience – our experience of 
objects and our experience of the lived body.  
His intentional analysis of intersubjectivity is divided into two parts – the noetic and the 
noematic. The noetic aspects of intersubjectivity – the mode the other is given – Husserl 
terms appresentation. As I have noted the other’s experience is not given directly or 
straightforwardly to us: for Husserl we experience others through the act of 
appresentation. Appresentation means that “the other is given along with something 
else, something which is straightforwardly present.”12 Other people are not the only type 
of objects which are appresented to consciousness. However, in cases of intersubjectivity 
the noetic act of appresentation is tightly correlated with the noematic content of other 
people in their bodily form.  
In intersubjective situations of apperception the “‘something else’ is the body of the 
other… I ‘see’ the other person as being ‘co-present’ with their body.”13 Thus Husserl 
founds his account of intersubjectivity upon an analysis of embodiment. Husserlian 
analysis of the body features in both of the theories of social cognition which are 
featured in my thesis – interaction theory and simulation theory. 
                                                          
11 Bernet, R, Kern, I & Marbach, E. (1989) An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology. Northwestern University Press: 
Illinois. Pp 155 – 156. 
12 Russel, M (2006) Husserl: A Guide for the Perplexed. Continuum:Hampshire. Pg 173. 
13 Ibid. 
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Goldman and de Vignemont claim that embodiment is the spectre haunting the halls of 
cognition research. The opposition of the embodiment movement towards classical 
cognitivism is so strong that Goldman and de Vignemont go as far as to incorporate this 
opposition into their definition of embodied theories of cognition. For them, any account 
of embodied cognition must be clearly distinguished from and stand as a substantial rival 
to classical cognition.14 Embodied cognition is “deeply dependent upon characteristics of 
the physical body of an agent, such that the agent's beyond-the-brain body plays a 
significant causal role, or a physically constitutive role, in that agent's cognitive 
processing.”15  
Gallagher states more specifically that it is the influence of the structure or function of 
the design of the body on cognition that makes cognition embodied. For example, when 
discussing the embodied nature of a particular sort of cognition – perception - Gallagher 
reports Strauss who argues that the structure of the whole body is designed in minute 
detail for upright posture. The postural possibilities allowed by standing and walking 
allow and constrain what we can see and attend to. Thus, regarding embodied nature of 
perception, he concludes with - “these physical facts, which we live as we live our body, 
constrain what counts as affordances and thereby what counts as the” perceptual 
world.16  
The embodied cognition movement is closely tied to two other theoretical notions – 
enaction and embeddedness. Demonstrating the close ties between the concepts of 
embodiment and enaction de Jaeger and di Paolo state that “for the enactive approach 
cognition is embodied action.”17 As an example of the enactive approach, they focus on 
the activity termed sense–making. Take for example the process of identifying an object 
as a sponge. This involves imbibing or imbuing the object in question with a particular, 
                                                          
14 Goldman, A & de Vignemont, F (2009) “Is Social Cognition Embodied?” Trends in Congitive Science. Vol .13, Iss. 4. Pg. 
154. 
15 Wilson, R & Foglia, L (2011). "Embodied Cognition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.) Accessed from  plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/embodied-cognition/>. Introduction. 
16 Gallagher, S (2008) “Intersubjectivity in perception.” Continental Philosophical Review. 40: Pg 164.  
17 De Jaeger, H & di Paulo, E (2007) “Participatory sense making: an enactive approach to social cognition”. Journal of 
Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. 6: Pg. 487. Differing italics. 
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concrete historically grounded meaning – that of being a particular type of object – a 
sponge. We cannot do this by visual perception alone (after all, it may only look like a 
sponge but in fact be a dog’s chew toy) but it is only through the enactive processes like 
grasping, probing and squeezing the sponge through the movements of the body that we 
make sense of the object by correctly categorizing it. Characterising the enactive nature 
of this process of making sense out of an object de Jaeger and di Paolo claim it is “the 
outcome of a particular kind of encounter between a ‘questioning’ agent with a particular 
body… and a ‘responding’ segment of the world… Movements are at the centre of mental 
activity: a sense-making agent’s movements… are the tools of her cognition.”18 
The embedded aspect to embodied cognition results because the body, our body, never 
finds itself dislocated from the world. The self not only has a spatial location in a 
physically constituted world – to be embedded means to find this world “at hand”.  
Gallagher draws on Heidegger’s analysis of circumspection to explicate embedded-ness. 
Circumspection is ‘that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use; 
and this has its own kind of ‘knowledge’’’ The environment and my pragmatic interaction 
with it offer certain affordances and this in turn shapes cognition. Gallagher states it is 
one of the necessary existential characteristics of the very nature of human existence 
itself to find oneself in the world – as in in-vovled – in this way, and this explicates the 
way embodied cognition is always embedded. “The world, in this sense, is not a 
collection of objects to be observed or contemplated by the mind. Rather, in a primary 
way, we have our hands in it.”19 
Thus, the embodiment movement relies on the analyses of a variety of 
phenomenological philosophers. Moreover, as a result of the insurgence of embodied 
considerations into theory of mind philosophy and cognitive science two theories have 
emerged. The first is a hybridization of embodied cognition and simulation theory – 
embodied simulation – and the second is interaction theory. As is consistent with 
embodied theories of mind both theories are closely related to the phenomenological 
                                                          
18 Ibid. Pg 489. 
19 Gallagher, S (2008) “Intersubjectivity in perception.” Continental Philosophical Review. Vol. 40. Pg. 165. 
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tradition. Interaction theory has ties both to the theories that result from 
phenomenological analysis and to the methodology of phenomenology.  
Embodied simulation is more involved with a close and exegetical reading of 
phenomenological analyses in order to determine areas of confluence between embodied 
simulation theory and phenomenological writings in general, but in particular with the 
writings of Merleau-Ponty. There has been much rich speculation about areas of 
confluence between phenomenology and simulation theory. Broome and Stranghellini 
speculate that embodied simulation’s theory of the mirror neuron system corroborates 
the intentionality thesis as it is conceived by Brentano. Lastly, these authors also note, 
Gallese argues his embodied simulation theory provides a neurophysiological substrate 
for Merleau-Ponty's accounts of “embodied subjectivity” and thus further bridges 
phenomenology and clinical neuroscience.20  
The embodiment movement is a part of the initial impetus towards a particularly vibrant 
strand of contemporary consciousness studies, which we might term “the hybrid 
project”. The hybrid project, which we see in the diverse work of authors such as 
Gallagher and Gallese, Natalie Depraz, Dan Zahavi, and Dieter Lohmar and others. It 
involves a return not only to the analyses of phenomenologists but also a return to the 
methods of phenomenology and a rethinking of the methodology of both empirical 
psychology and phenomenology. Interaction theory is a product of the hybrid project. 
Not only do phenomenological analysis feature prominently in interaction theory but, in 
the writings of interaction theorists (such as Gallagher), there is a rethinking of the 
methods of phenomenology.  This rethinking is based on a close reading of Husserl: 
based on it in an essential way. 
Gallagher relies on Husserl’s distinction of between a formal ontology and a material or 
regional ontology. Discerning the eidetic structures of a formal ontology requires eidetic 
intuition. However, regarding material regions pure intuition in the sense required above 
                                                          
20 Broome, M & Stanghellinni, G (2010). “From Brentano to mirror neurons: Bridging phenomenology and 
clinical neuroscience”. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging. Vol. 183. Pg. 245.  
12 
 
is unnecessary and, Gallagher argues, sometimes even problematic. As Husserl himself 
distinguished, the psyche, taken as an object of nature, has its own regional ontology, 
the study of which is the practice of psychology, considered distinct from 
phenomenology.21  
The study of the region of psyche – psychology – is not a transcendental study. Thus, 
Gallagher’s argument is, it does not require a fully transcendental method. So if we take 
for example the phenomenological method of eidetic variation (which this thesis will 
discuss in some detail in chapter three) Gallagher argues psychologists need not be 
restricted to running through this method in the imagination or conception of the 
researcher alone. At least not in the study of a material region like the psyche. Gallagher 
argues that real life derivations might serve the same function as thought experiments 
regarding distinguishing the essential structures of material regions. He thus contrasts 
“factual” variation with the method of eidetic variation and claims that the former might 
fill the role of the latter. The sources of these real life factual variations are the results 
from empirical experiments and psychopathological case studies.22  
Gallagher further argues that other methods of variation which don’t rely on purely 
imaginative variation may also be helpful in advancing cognitive science, i.e. computer 
and artificial intelligence modelling. He argues computer simulation models in the field of 
artificial life are a type of eidetic variation. “One can view simulation methods as 
technological extensions of one's imaginative capacity, providing a crucial link between 
phenomenology and the increasingly complex (nonlinear, dynamical, self-organizing) 
phenomena of the empirical sciences.”23 Gallagher claims these technologically enhanced 
methods of variation may be necessary if phenomenology is to live up to its ambitions.  
These represent new forms of phenomenological method or, as Gallagher refers to it, 
they represent the “outsourcing” of phenomenological methods.  
                                                          
21 Gallagher, S. (2012). “Taking stock of phenomenology futures.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 50, No. 2. Pg. 
309. 
22 Ibid. Pp. 309 – 312. 
23 Ibid. Pg. 309. 
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This second form of outsourcing is of critical importance because of its links to the 
project of naturalizing phenomenology. Roy et. al. argue that these forms of computer 
modelling based on dynamical systems theory represents advances in mathematics that 
Husserl could not have foreseen and that some aspects of the phenomenological method 
can now be formalized in dynamical models. This procedure of mathematically 
formalizing phenomenological methods is a step towards the naturalization of 
phenomenology. 24 
What we are left with, after viewing the landscape of contemporary methodological 
forms of phenomenological method, is a fairly radically different view of phenomenology 
than the one conceived of by the continental tradition; Husserl in particular. My central 
concern in this thesis is the traditional phenomenological method - particularly 
description – as it was conceived by Husserl. My thesis is that Husserlian description and 
analyses is an underutilised methodological tool in the contemporary scholarly discussion 
of intersubjectivity, and one that simulation theory might need to adopt if it is to remain 
a viable alternative as a theory of social cognition.  
The second chapter of my thesis will give a detailed account of embodied simulation and 
interaction theory with emphasis on the phenomenological analyses which in both cases 
form a backbone to these theories. I will then detail some of the points of critique of 
embodied simulation from the interaction camp, particularly the critique that there is no 
“experiential” or phenomenological evidence for simulational processes at all. I will detail 
how it is speculated that phenomenological description might be able to resolve some of 
the current points of debate between simulation theory and interaction theory, such as 
the personal/subpersonal boundary of simulation and embodied simulation, and the 
extent and nature of personal level simulation. However, the next chapter of my thesis 
also points to some of the ambiguities concerning the term phenomenological description 
in the context of contemporary discussions of intersubjectivity. 
                                                          
24 In Ibid, Pg. 313. 
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It is for this reason that a clear definition and characterisation of the process of 
phenomenological description becomes necessary. In order to evaluate whether or not 
we are able to phenomenologically describe simulation, it is necessary to discuss just 
what a phenomenological description is. For the sake of simplicity, I have narrowed my 
discussion only to Husserlian phenomenological description. There is wide authorship on 
certain elements of Husserl’s method, i.e. the reductions and bracketing, however 
description is comparatively underrepresented in the literature.  The third chapter in my 
thesis will give a definition of a Husserlian description and discuss three of its 
characteristic features. I will also provide numerous examples which demonstrate both 
my definition and those features.      
The fourth chapter will begin with an assessment of the current existing accounts of 
simulation which resemble a phenomenological description. I will also assess the claim, 
made by Gallagher, that we find no phenomenological evidence for simulation. I will 
discuss the notion of phenomenological evidence. I will argue that, as yet, simulation 
theory has not even begun to utilise the most basic of Husserl’s phenomenological 
method, particularly description, despite the emergent need for it, and ergo Gallagher’s 
claim has been made pre-emptively. Furthermore, Husserl’s mature theories on 
intersubjectivity are yet to be given serious consideration within contemporary 
discussions of intersubjectivity within the cognitive sciences, despite the overall recent 
resurgence of interest in phenomenology. I will argue that a return to the methods and 
analyses of Husserl may be able to advance the debate between simulation theory and 
interaction theory. 
   
In conclusion, this introduction has surveyed the literature concerning intersubjectivity at 
the meeting point of cognitive science and phenomenology. It began with a brief outline 
of classical cognitivism and its concerns with the problem of other minds and the 
explanatory gap. I then detailed classical cognitivism’ theory of intersubjectivity, termed 
15 
 
theory theory, and noted that simulation theory was initially put forward as a theoretical 
alternative to theory theory. This introduction discussed the rise of embodied 
considerations into discussions of intersubjectivity and detailed the connections between 
embodiment and the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger and Maurice Merleau Ponty. 
Lastly I discussed the relation between two theories of embodied social cognition - 
interaction theory and embodied simulation – and their reliance on phenomenological 
analysis and, in the case of interaction theory, innovation in phenomenological method. 
Finally, I have detailed the aims and layout of my own thesis. 
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Chapter 2. 
What is it Like to Simulate Another’s Consciousness? Simulation and interaction theory, 
the phenomenological argument against simulation and phenomenological description. 
In this chapter I will discuss two theories of social cognition, the first is simulation theory 
with emphasis on Vittorio Gallese’s strain of this theory - embodied simulation. The 
second theory I will discuss is Shaun Gallagher’s theory of interaction and direct 
perception. This chapter has four sections. In each section the interaction between 
phenomenology and contemporary cognitive science will be highlighted. The first part of 
this chapter characterises and discusses simulation theory and embodied simulation, 
with an emphasis on its functional characterisation and the neurological evidence 
provided for it (i.e. mirror neurons). The second part defines and discusses interaction 
theory and direct perception. This moves into a discussion, in the third part of this 
chapter, of the critique of simulation theory and embodied simulation by the interaction 
camp. Two avenues of critique I will discuss are, firstly, that the theory of interaction 
and direct perception explain mirror neuron activity and are theoretically preferable to 
simulation theory, and secondly the charge that personal level simulation is not affirmed 
by phenomenological investigation. In the final part I will argue that phenomenological 
description is a distinct methodological tool and that simulation theory and embodied 
simulation, whether personal or subpersonal, might benefit from closer adherence to 
phenomenology’s descriptive protocol in explorations of intersubjectivity. 
Embodied simulation, as its name suggests, has a dual genealogy – one half 
embodiment and one half simulation theory. Gallese characterizes simulation as the 
production of pretend mental states that match the mental states of others as closely as 
possible to enable mind-reading.25 Mind reading is defined as the correct attribution of a 
mental state to another. Simulation theory claims simulation is constitutive of mind 
reading. Gallese explains that most simulation theories postulate a process of pretense. 
                                                          
25 Gallese, V & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind reading. Trends in 
Cognitive Science. Vol. 2, No. 12. Pg. 497.  
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“People first create in themselves pretend desires, preferences and beliefs of the sort 
they assume others to have. These are then fed into their own decision-making 
mechanism, which outputs pretend decisions that they use to predict the decisions of 
others”.26 Gallese states that in simulation the pretend desires and beliefs of the other 
are experienced as if they were our own but in an offline mode, which means that “the 
output is not actual behavior but only predictions or anticipations of behavior.”27 Gallese 
states that simulation is a functional notion which is assigned a causal role in the process 
of social cognition known as mind reading. 
Gallese also endorses a particular strain of simulation – the theory of embodied 
simulation - although he does not claim it is the only type of simulation that contributes 
to intersubjective processes. Embodied simulation can be distinguished from other 
simulation theories because it is subpersonal and involves neither deliberation nor 
pretense.28 Gallese follows Goldman and De Vignemont’s taxonomy of versions of the 
embodiment theses and identifies embodied simulation as mainly falling into the class 
“representation in bodily format.”29 In discussing what exactly defines a format Goldman 
and De Vignemont state that the idea of a “format of mental representation is familiar in 
cognitive science, although there is no consensus about what formats there are or how 
to individuate them. Some formats are modality-specific: a visual format, an auditory 
format and so forth.” Goldman and De Vignemont state that tokens of the contents of 
the formats possess characteristic features which in turn helps to distinguish the 
format.30 Gallese gives as examples of the typical types of contents which we would 
need to represent in bodily format - representing the goal of reaching to grasp an object 
like a cup or the “emotions… such as disgust or pain, or a sensation, such as being 
                                                          
26 Gallese, V & Sinigaglia, C. (2011) What is so special about embodied simulation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 
Vol. 15, No. 11. Pg. 512.  
27 Gordon, R. (2009) Folk Psychology as Mental Simulation. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.). Accessed from http//plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/folkpsych-simulation/.  
28 Gallese, V & Sinigaglia, C. (2011) What is so special about embodied simulation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 
Vol. 15, No. 11. Pg. 516. 
29 Ibid, pg. 513. 
30 Goldman, A & de Vignemont, F. Is social cognition embodied? Trends in Cognitive Science. Article in Press. 
Pg. 2.  
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touched”.31 These are the typical sort of contents which would be represented in bodily 
format. Gallese’s thesis is that some simulations are embodied which means that they 
are represented in a bodily format. 
As Gallese notes embodied simulation aims “to account for basic social interactions by 
means of a… theoretically unitary framework.”32 Gallese’s theoretical framework is 
fleshed out by his use of phenomenological analyses. Gallese has advocated for the 
“phenomenologizing of the cognitive neurosciences”.33 Merleau Ponty features 
prominently in Gallese’s thought. Merleau-Ponty sought to overcome the traditional 
dichotomies of philosophy – i.e. empiricism against intellectualism; mind against body. 
He found the point of synthesis in the lived body’s engagement with the world, 
particularly through the act of perception. Merleau-Ponty rejected the notion of an ideal, 
theoretical and disembodied mind and empirical notions like the mechanical, causal 
notions of the reflexive arc or unit of sense datum. Instead, for Merleau-Ponty, the self is 
a synthesis or dialectical process which overcomes these dichotomies in order to 
establish a meaningful world of experience.34   
For Merleau-Ponty the body itself has a type of intentionality. For him there is an 
intentional relation not just between mental acts and their objects but between parts of 
the body and parts of the world. He takes as an example the phenomenon of a phantom 
limb (one that has been removed but is still “felt”). Noticeably phantom limbs (such as 
the hand) are still experienced “as a correlate of those aspects of the world which “speak 
to” the hand, namely, the piano to be played, the doorknob to be opened, and so forth. 
When the patient who experiences phantom limb restructures his/ her world in such a 
manner that the things no longer beckon to the lost limb, then the experience of it 
                                                          
31 Gallese, V & Sinigaglia, C. (2011) What is so special about embodied simulation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 
Vol. 15, No. 11. Pg. 516. 
32 Ibid, Pg. 515. 
33 Gallese, V. Neuroscience and phenomenology. (2011) Phenomenology and Mind: The Online Journal of the 
centre of Phenomenology and Studies of the Human Person. Pg. 34. Accessed from 
http://www.phenomenologyandmind.eu/. 
34 Flynn, B. (2012) "Maurice Merleau-Ponty", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  Edward N. Zalta (Ed.) 
Sections 1, 3 & 7. Accessed from plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/merleau-ponty/>. 
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vanishes.” The phenomenon of a phantom hand demonstrates that there is an 
intentional relation between the body and the world. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of corporeal 
intentionality “…is a notion which is formed in order to express the intertwining of the 
sensate and the sensible, their intertwining and their reversibility… rather than having 
the model of act and object, one has the image of a fold, and of the body as the place of 
this fold by which the sensible reveals itself.”35 
In a paper with C. Sinigaglia, concerning the notion of bodily representation, Gallese 
follows Merleau Ponty’s conception of the body schema. He states that our awareness of 
ourselves is constituted not only by an awareness of my body as always present but also 
as an awareness that this body is the source of power for action. Gallese quotes 
Merleau-Ponty when he writes that the body schema as a source of potential action 
“provides us with a way of access to the world and the object, with a praktognosia, 
which has to be recognized as original and perhaps as primary”.36 The body schema, 
which Gallese claims represents the minimal or core sense of self, also plays a key role 
in embodied simulation. Gallese claims that it “is not possible to conceive of oneself as a 
self without rooting this process of appraisal in the sharing of the same motor intentional 
horizon.”37 
Gallese also aims to provide neurological evidence for his theory of embodied simulation. 
Gallese is a member of the Parma group which discovered mirror neurons. His main 
source of evidence for embodied simulation is research on mirror neurons. Mirror 
neurons are a specific class of neurons discharging both during the execution and the 
observation of a given behaviour. Mirror neurons are located in the areas of the brain 
(are F5) that are responsible for the planning of motor execution. The insight of mirror 
neuron research is that the same neurons located in the area of the brain responsible for 
movement and action also fire when we perceive that same action. The motor system is 
reused during observation. Gallese “posits that the mirror mechanism implements 
                                                          
35 Ibid, section 7. 
36 Gallese, V & Sinigaglia, C. (2010) The bodily self as power for action. Neuropsychologia. Vol. 48, Pg. 748.  
37 Ibid, Pg. 752. 
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mental simulation primarily because brain and cognitive resources typically used for one 
purpose are reused for another purpose.”38 Gallese maintains that embodied simulation 
exploits the “intrinsic functional organization of the motor cortex” and “the notion of 
reuse of mental states represented with a bodily format provides a convincing 
simulational account of the mirroring mechanism… and its role in mind-reading.”39 
Gallese adds that what “makes the activation of mirror neurons during the observation 
of the actions of others an “as if” process is… the fact that in spite of an activation of the 
motor system in the observer’s brain, the action is not executed.”40 
Furthermore, evidence for simulation theory is provided by studies on humans and 
primates which show that mirror neurons fire when only part of an action is observed. 
Simulation theory proposes the process of simulation is responsible for determining the 
goal of the action. As further evidence for simulation, studies suggest that overlapping 
areas of the brain are active when we execute, observe and imagine someone 
performing an action.41 The mirror mechanism maps the sensory representation of the 
action, emotion or sensation of another onto the perceiver’s own motor, viscero-motor or 
somatosensory representation of that action, emotion or sensation. This mapping 
enables one to perceive the action, emotion or sensation of another as if one were 
performing that action or experiencing that emotion or sensation oneself. Gallese states 
that his theory of embodied simulation does not aim to provide a general theory of 
mental simulation covering all kinds of simulational mind-reading. Rather, it aims to 
explain the mirror neuron system and related phenomena.  For Gallese the mirror 
neuron system is the sub-personal neurological substrate which underpins the process of 
embodied simulation. Gallese claims that the relational character of representations in 
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39 Gallese. V & Sinigalgia, C. (2012). Response to de Bruin and Gallagher: embodied simulation as reuse is a 
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40 Gallese, V. Neuroscience and phenomenology. (2011) Phenomenology and Mind: The Online Journal of the 
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bodily format and the sharing of motor intentional horizons is underpinned, at the neural 
level, by the mirror mechanism.42  
Lately simulation theory and research on mirror neurons have come under close critical 
scrutiny and, in the third part of this paper, I will present some of the points of this 
critique that have stemmed from the interaction camp. Beforehand however, the next 
section of this paper will provide a brief outline of interaction theory and direct 
perception which, for Gallagher, constitute primary intersubjectivity. 
Gallagher writes that an “important shift is taking place in social cognition research, 
away from a focus on the individual mind and toward… participatory aspects of social 
understanding…” Interaction theory is put forward in order to “galvanize” the interactive 
turn in explanations of social cognition.43 Gallaher claims that simulation theory is still 
too tied to methodological individualism: understanding others depends primarily on 
cognitive capabilities or mechanisms located in an individual subject, or on processes 
that take place inside an individual brain.44 Gallagher claims that the notion of mind-
reading and simulation are still processes that occur within the confines of our own head 
and that they don’t incorporate a “second person perspective” or intersubjective 
perspective on social cognition.  
The second person perspective is a core theoretical distinction in interaction theory. The 
second person or intersubjective perspective means the participant or co-experiencing 
perspective, referring to situations of reciprocal interaction that are characterized by 
some form of mutual relatedness and coupling of the partners. Fuchs notes that the 
“duality of the first and the third person perspective is an established opposition in 
philosophy of mind where it is mainly used to demonstrate the irreducibility of 
subjectivity as against a physicalistic concept of the world… However, in studies of social 
                                                          
42 Gallese, V. Mirror neurons, embodied simulation and the neural basis of social identification. Psychoanalytic 
Dialogues: The International Journal of Relational Perspectives. Vol. 19, No. 5. Pp. 519 – 536. 
43 Gallagher, S, De Jaeger, H & Di Paulo, E. (2010) Can social interaction constitute social cognition? Trends in 
Cognitive Science. Vol. 14, No. 10. Pg 441. 
44 Gallagher, S & Zahavi, D. (2013) The Phenomenological Mind. Routledge: Kindle Edition. Kindle location 
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cognition this duality seems insufficient.”45 Gallagher argues for the primacy of the 
second person perspective and interactions in social understanding. Interaction theory 
argues that the first person perspective and the third person perspective are both 
abstractions from the second person perspective, which underlies our everyday 
interactions with others.46 
Gallagher terms the individual person an autonomous agent, however, the individual is 
viewed as an autonomous system – a co-dependent network of processes “able to 
sustain itself and define an identity as a self-determined system.” He adds that examples 
of this type of “systemic relation can be found on many different levels. Examples 
include… sensorimotor flows of neural and bodily activity, habits, social institutions and 
so on.”47 The individual person is the primary (though not the only) type of autonomous 
agent or system that features in interaction theory theories account of social congnition. 
Individuals involve in coupling, regulated coupling and co-regulated coupling. Coupling is 
“the influence between a system’s variables and another system’s parameters”,48 for 
instance keeping my dog on a leash so he cannot run away when I walk him. Regulated 
coupling is “changes that an agent makes to the constraints and parametrical conditions 
that influence the coupling between the agent and another system.”49 An example of 
regulating a coupling activity would be moving closer to someone to hear them better 
during a conversation. If both individuals or systems regulate their coupling behaviour 
this is termed co-regulated coupling. Gallagher defines a social interaction as two “or 
more autonomous agents co-regulating their coupling with the effect that… their 
relational dynamics acquire an autonomy of their own. Examples: conversations, 
collaborative work, arguments, collective action, dancing”.50 
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Direct perception, along with interaction, constitute, for Gallagher, primary 
intersubjectivity. Direct perception is the theoretical alternative to simulation and 
attempts to account for many social processes we would otherwise consider as 
simulatory.51 Gallagher roots his theory of perception in Husserl’s analysis. Husserl 
claimed “that perception is the basis for abstract thought and, as such, plays a 
foundational role in our cognitive architecture. He treats perceptual knowledge, 
furthermore, as exemplary for knowledge generally.”52  
Both Husserl, and Gallagher following him, claim that perception involves kinesthesis - a 
pre-reflective and embedded sense of one’s own movements. He claims that we do not 
have kinaesthetic sensations only when we move “but that such kinaesthetic sensation is 
implicitly connected with our perception of objects – the something that we perceive 
registers in a certain way within our kinaesthetic system.”53 The body can be divided into 
a series of kinaesthetic subsystems – the eyes, upper body and head and the lower 
body: these subsystems are continuous and can fulfil interchangeable roles in acts of 
perception. Each subsystem is connected with a distinct ability for self-movement. 
Together with presentational contents of the visual field, kinaesthetic sensations of eye 
movement form what Husserl calls the oculomotor system.54 Regarding the oculomotor 
system specifically Husserl writes that “to every position in the visual field there 
corresponds a sensation of the position of the eye… and every visual line that the gaze 
runs over has a correspondence in a continuous kinaesthetic sequence”.55 
Regarding direct perception in intersubjectivity Gallagher states that “when we see 
someone else act in a certain way, our own kinaesthetic system is activated in a way 
that mirrors the perceived action. This, in part, is what allows us to understand the other 
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person. Moreover, and importantly, this kinaesthetic activation is part of the perceptual 
process – part of the hyletic processes that underpin the noetic aspect of perception”. 
This is a point that Gallagher wants to bring into focus. “We are talking about 
transformations that inform the noetic side of experience, although, as we know, this is 
tightly correlated with noematic content. In this case, the fact that we are perceiving 
another human being, rather than something else, reverberates in the noetic structure of 
consciousness.”56 This account of direct perception and its role in social cognition offers a 
theoretical alternative to embodied simulation. By acknowledging that we bodily mirror 
others bodily movements but claiming that this relation is kinaesthetic and is classified 
as a feature of the act or process of direct perception when it is directed towards the 
noematic content of another body Gallagher is cancelling out the need to postulate 
simulatory processes that would  otherwise play a similar theoretical role.  
Gallagher also claims that the process of direct perception may explain the activity of the 
mirror neuron system. Gallagher notes that mirror neuron activity is preceded by 
“activation in primary perceptual areas, e.g. visual cortex, corresponding to our seeing 
an action; this is followed immediately (30– 100 milliseconds later) by activation of” the 
mirror neuron system.57 Gallagher argues that if we accept that perception is a 
temporally extended phenomenon then, given the extremely close temporal ties 
neurologically, it is entirely possible the activity of the mirror neuron system is a 
property of the act of perception. Gallagher claims one could argue that mirror neuron 
activity is part “of the processes that underlie intersubjective perception rather than the 
extra cognitive step of simulation. That is, we can regard these processes as 
underpinning a direct perception of the other person’s intentions, rather than a distinct 
mental process of simulating their intentions.”58 
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Both embodied simulation and interaction theory are theories with close theoretical and, 
in Gallagher’s case, methodical ties to the phenomenological tradition. One of the issues 
I take up with the debate between these two camps is that at times the distinction 
between just any description given from a first person point of view and what counts as 
a phenomenological description is unclear. Furthermore, this lack of clarity result in a 
blurring of the definition of phenomenology. “In recent philosophy of mind, the term 
“phenomenology” is often restricted to the characterization of… what it is like to have 
sensations of various kinds. However, our experience is normally much richer in content 
than mere sensation.”59  
An example of the blurring of this distinction is when Gallagher claims that 
phenomenology “can serve as a useful diagnostic tool... If a patient walks into the 
emergency room and complains of headaches and blindness in one eye, the neurologist 
would be remiss to simply assure the patient that phenomenology is not always 
dependable.”60 In this example Gallagher is focusing on a ‘simple’ sense of the term 
phenomenology instead of a fuller traditional or ‘rich’ sense of the term.  
If we interpret the term phenomenology from a rich perspective the neurologists’ 
assurance is a non-sequitur; a valid response from the patient would be “I’m not doing 
any phenomenology”. The patient is certainly giving a first person report of experience, 
but is this enough to classify this practice as the same as phenomenology? I think it’s 
probably right to say that although we might classify these sort of average everyday 
reports as a possible element of the phenomenological method of description – a sort of 
piece of raw data - they certainly do not constitute the whole thing. They are the 
fragmented potential pieces of a phenomenological description; neither necessary nor 
sufficient for it. In the phenomenological tradition the term “phenomenology is given a 
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much wider range, addressing the meaning things have in our experience”.61 Smith 
states that such simple descriptions indicate the basic domain of study but it is only by 
abstracting from them that we begin to develop the science of phenomenology.62 As the 
next chapter in my thesis will show, description, as Husserl conceived it, is a technical 
process which has specific features which distinguish it from merely any description of 
experience in the first person.  
There are numerous references throughout the phenomenological literature testifying to 
the difficulty and lengthy amount of time and practice involved in phenomenological 
description.63 This suggests that phenomenological description is not just any first 
person description and that we should maintain a distinction between the two. I rely on 
this distinction when I suggest that simulation theory is in need of greater 
phenomenological description. I think that simulation theory and embodied simulation 
could benefit, not just from theoretical use of phenomenological analyses, but also from 
paying more attention to what has been termed phenomenology’s methodological 
“descriptive protocol”.64 In the next section of this thesis I will define Husserlian 
phenomenology and discuss its main characteristics, and discuss some of the practices 
involved, in order to understand how phenomenological description might benefit 
simulation theory and the debate between it and interaction theory. 
Gallagher has also suggested that research on simulation can benefit from greater 
phenomenological description and he has also used phenomenological argument as a 
form of critique of simulation theory. He states that we can phenomenologically 
distinguish, for example, between the third person/allocentric perspective: I imagine 
seeing someone over there reaching for the glass, and the third person/egocentric 
perspective: I imagine being over there in their place doing the action “from the 
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inside”.65 He claims that these phenomenological distinctions were not incorporated into 
the design of the latest research on simulation which suggests differing areas of the 
brain are active when we execute, observe and imagine an action. Simulation theory 
requires more concrete descriptions and examples which highlight and compliment the 
sort of structures outlined by Gallagher: examples which bare out distinguishing 
features.  
Gallagher claims that phenomenological investigation provides an argument against 
personal level simulation. He states that “there is no experiential evidence that I use 
such conscious (imaginative, introspective) simulation routines. That is, when we consult 
our own common experience of how we understand others, we don’t find such 
processes”.66 I will argue, in this thesis, that the notion of “experiential evidence” is one 
that needs to be unpacked before the above claim can be substantiated. The next essay 
of this thesis will unpack the method involved in a phenomenological descriptive 
investigation and the final concluding section will discuss Husserl’s notion of 
phenomenological evidence before returning to assess this claim.  
In the opening of Alvin Goldman’s Simulating Minds we find the closest account 
resembling a phenomenological description of simulation but I will show, also in the 
conclusion to this thesis, that this account is inadequate and that, as yet, despite the 
theoretical engagement with phenomenological authors, simulation theory is yet to begin 
to seriously utilise the most basic of phenomenological tools, i.e. description. A 
reorientation of method is necessary if this is to be achieved. 
Either way, subpersonal embodied simulation escapes Gallagher’s phenomenologically 
based criticisms because if “simulation is subpersonal, and not something of which we 
would be aware, then phenomenology is not in a position to raise objections, since 
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phenomenology doesn’t give us access to the subpersonal domain.”67 Although he claims 
that phenomenology may not be able to provide descriptions of subpersonal processes 
elsewhere Gallagher states that “phenomenology can give us some clues about what 
might be happening… in low-level, subpersonal processes of social cognition.”68 
Gallagher argues that the phenomenological account often “counts as part of the 
explanation of subpersonal processes. If a neuroscientist tells me that neurons in area 
F5 are firing, I have no explanation of what that means until she gives me some 
indication of what it correlates to on the personal level of experience or behaviour. In 
many cases the only way to define the explanandum is in terms of phenomenological 
description.”69  
However, regarding the subpersonal status of embodied simulation specifically even 
Gallese states that “our brain has developed a basic functional mechanism which I 
qualify as embodied simulation which gives us an experiential insight of others minds. 
The specific nature of such experiential insight is still very loosely defined, and there is a 
lot of very meticulous philosophical work in parallel with neuroscientific work to much 
better specify what we qualify as ‘experiential’”.70 In the conclusion to this chapter I will 
discuss Husserl’s rather meticulous work on intersubjectivity and sketch the preliminary 
directions this “meticulous philosophical work” might take today, based on my in depth 
discussion of Husserlian method and analyses of intersubjectivity.  
In conclusion, the first section of this chapter gave an outline of simulation theory and 
embodied simulation with emphasis on both the functional aspects and areas of 
phenomenological influence within them. I also attempted to outline the neurological 
underpinnings provided as evidence for embodied simulation and simulation theory. The 
second section discussed interaction theory. I began with a delineation of core the 
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theoretical notion of the second person perspective and a definition of interaction theory 
and discussion of the role of kinesthesis in direct perception.  
This discussion moved, in the third part of this essay, into some criticisms levelled at 
simulation theory by interaction theory, i.e. the charge that direct perception is a better 
theoretical alternative and that direct perception better explains mirror neuron activity. 
Finally I discussed Gallaher’s claim that we find no phenomenological evidence for the 
process of explicit personal level simulation. I have suggested, in the last part of this 
essay, that phenomenological description is a methodological tool that needs to be 
distinguished from just any average description derived from the first person point of 
view. I have also given some indications of the layout of the rest of this thesis. The next 
section of my thesis moves to an explication of Husserlian phenomenological description 
before returning, in the conclusion, to the relation between phenomenology and the 
current debate between simulation theory and interaction theory concerning 
intersubjectivity.   
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Chapter 3. 
Definition and characterisation of Husserlian phenomenological description. 
In comparison to other areas of Husserlian phenomenology, the topic of description is 
underrepresented in the literature. There is, to my knowledge, no definition to date, nor 
is there extended characterisation or discussion on this topic. Description is often 
neglected at the expense of other more sophisticated phenomenological tools, such as 
the reductions. Husserlian phenomenology is often referred to as “descriptive”, and there 
is discussion as to why this is the case, i.e. why Husserl adopted a descriptive analytic 
method. But there is little to no discussion on what Husserlian description is. This section 
of my thesis will seek to address this gap, particularly with an eye to discerning in the 
concluding chapter how Husserlian phenomenology might be applied to the current 
debates between interaction theory and simulation theory.  
This work begins by providing my own (broad) definition of Husserlian phenomenological 
description as: a description of the forms and structures of conscious experience. The 
introductory section of this work will unpack this definition. The next three section will 
then provide some specific characteristics of Husserlian description. 1) Husserlian 
description begins at the level of the individual, actual experience, but that it then moves 
to the level of the description of universal levels of structure; the eidetic level. 2) 
Husserlian description ranges from focusing on the noematic or the noetic dimensions of 
experience and its goal is the exposure of the relations between these experiential poles. 
3) Methodologically, Husserlian description follows the processes of intuition and 
analyses. I will finish with a discussion of the creative nature of Husserlian description. 
The first term I will unpack from my definition is description. A description is a linguistic 
entity designed for communication. A dictionary definition of the term description is 
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discourse intended to give a mental image of something experienced.71 The aim of a 
description is a similitude in mental content between communicators. In description we 
detail things and their properties to others in a way that they see those things with those 
properties in the same way we do. Etymologically, the word describe literally means to 
‘write down’; to copy or transcribe; a description implies some type of re-presentation. 
The aim of a description is to indirectly (i.e. via a representation) communicate what one 
person is seeing, hearing or thinking (for example) to another person just as they see or 
think it, without alteration or change  
An important function of phenomenological description is to serve as a ‘signpost’ to 
phenomena. Understanding a phenomenological description means that readers of the 
described experience themselves experience the described structures of the experience, 
in an indirect mode, via a linguistic representation. A phenomenological analytic 
description doesn’t need to decide on the designating terms of the components of the 
structure of the experience. Instead, it tries to make the readers perceive or imagine the 
experience grasped.72 
The principal theme of Husserlian phenomenological description is conscious experience 
(Erlebnis). Taken in its broadest sense the term includes all mental processes.73 
Husserlian description thus has a fairly wide purview. Husserl describes experience as an 
immediate, pre-theoretical, “mental nexus”, which knows only internally interwoven 
states. He notes that, even though experience is in flux from one moment to the next, it 
is interconnected and interpenetrated in various ways, and composes a real harmonious 
unity for each individual mind (PP, pg. 45). Pre – predicative conscious experience is the 
matrix of all our predicative and scientific knowledge.74 Husserl states that “…precepts’, 
imaginative and pictorial presentations, acts of conceptual thinking, surmises and 
doubts, joys and griefs, hopes and fears, wishes and acts of will etc., are, just as they 
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flourish in our consciousness, 'experiences'” (LI, Pg. 202). Husserl notes that the 
experiential world has an a priori, universal or necessary structure (PP, Pg. 42). The aim 
of Husserlian phenomenology is to abstract the content of an experience from the flux of 
consciousness, so that we may describe the various universal and necessary forms and 
structures of consciousness.  
Conscious experience is essentially intentional; it refers to objects other than itself of 
which it is an experience.75 The prototypical form or superstructure of consciousness is 
the intentional relation. For Husserl, the intentional relation is the defining architecture 
of conscious experience; “a fundamental characteristic of all psychic life which is given 
quite immediately and prior to all theories” (PP, Pg. 22). Smith summarizes Husserl’s 
theory of intentionality as: “an act of consciousness is intentionally directed via a 
meaning toward an object.”  He notes Husserl’s Ideas 1 is a “very close account of how 
reflection on our experience explicates the intentionality of consciousness”.76  
Intentionality is a relation which expresses itself in all aspects of conscious experience: 
in acts of judgement, expression, desire, through our embodiment and perceptual acts, 
and our engagement with the intersubjective world. We might put this metaphorically as, 
when viewed or seen from a holistic perspective, the ‘shape’ or superstructure of 
consciousness is intentionality. The purpose of phenomenological description is to detail 
how the arches, vaults, flying buttresses, bricks and mortar, etc. contain and compose 
this superstructure.   
Thus, the first section of this essay has provided an unpacked definition of Husserlian 
phenomenological description. The topic of such a description is: the structures and 
forms of any mental event or its object. The prototypical or superstructural form is: the 
intentional relation. A Husserlian description seeks to linguistically communicate the 
structure and forms of these experiences as one person experiences them to another. 
This definition is broad enough to cover all cases of Husserlian phenomenological 
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description but, because of this broadness, it is still perhaps a little vague. Therefore the 
next section of this essay will attempt to provide a more detailed account of a 
characteristic feature of Husserlian phenomenological description – that it begins with 
the description of individuals but proceeds to the level of the universal or eidetic. The 
next section also contains examples which demonstrate this feature, and the broad 
definition of Husserlian description provided.  
Husserlian phenomenology contains numerous types or styles of description of the 
structures of conscious experience. It proceeds on different “levels” and in different 
“directions”. The most basic and elementary level is the description of precise individual 
examples of actual lived experience. As an example of this type of description I will 
firstly present a passage from Husserl’s discussion on the consciousness of internal time 
which represents “a typical example of Husserl’s descriptive analysis.”77  
Husserl firstly begins by describing a single experience of an object which has temporal 
extension - a melody. After consideration however he is discontent with this example 
and isolates an individual tone for description. After a process of distilling and clarifying 
(via bracketing and the development of terminology) Husserl provides this precise 
description of the highly specific lived experience of the temporal duration of an 
individual tone. Notice how Husserl’s description “unfolds” its object – that is, through 
abstraction and analysis, Husserl discovers a complex structure to a seemingly simple 
phenomenal experience; he illustrates his “skill in finding great complexity where others 
see only simplicity.”78 
He begins by noticing: “I am conscious of the tone and of the duration that it fills in a 
continuity of ‘modes’” (PCIT, Pg. 25). That is, the mode-of–the past: retention, or, the 
mode–of–the-now: perception. However, these modes present to consciousness “in a 
‘continual flow.’” Husserl isolates the different parts or “phases” which compose the 
unified structure of this temporal experience: 
                                                          
77 Farber, M. (1943) The Foundation of Phenomenology. State University of New York Press: Albany. Pg. 516. 
78 Ibid, Pg. 517. 
34 
 
“…one point, one phase of this flow is called “consciousness of the commencing 
tone”; and in this phase I am conscious of the first time point of the tones 
duration in the mode of the now. The tone is given; that is, I am conscious of it 
as now… However, if any temporal phase (corresponding to a time point of the 
tone duration) is an actually present now (with the exception of the initial phase), 
then I am conscious of a continuity of phases as “immediately past” and of the 
whole extent of the temporal duration from the beginning-point up to the now-
point has elapsed. I am not yet conscious of the remaining extent of the duration, 
however. When the final now-point is reached, I am conscious of this point itself 
as the now-point and of the whole duration has elapsed (or I am conscious of it 
as elapsed at the beginning point of the new extent of time, which is no longer a 
tonal extent)” (PCIT, Pp. 25 – 26). 
Thus in summary, Husserl’s description reveals a complex phenomenological structure 
within the experience of the temporal duration of an individual sound such as a tone. 
Such an experience is organised around two phenomenological phases – the first time 
point of the tones duration in the mode of the now, and the final time point of the tones 
duration in the mode of the now. Once we have past the first phase we are continuously 
aware of a series of phases as “just past” and it is not until the final phase is past we 
become aware of the end of the temporal tonal extension.   
Something that becomes immediately clear from this initial example is the analytic 
component to Husserlian description. Even the initial stage description of particular 
phenomenon involves an analysis of the structure of the phenomenon. All types of 
Husserlian description is preceded by analysis however. This means distinguishing the 
different parts, i.e. pieces, moments – in the above case, phases – etc. of what’s being 
described. Husserl himself states that description means not merely the pure expression 
of what is “seen” but rather also “the most far reaching possible analysis of the seen into 
its parts to be unfolded intuitively” (PP, Pg. 21).    
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Another demonstration of Husserlian description beginning at the level of singular 
empirical experience can be found in the sixth logical investigation. Husserl is 
investigating the relations that hold between perceptual acts, which are given with a 
high degree of intuitive fullness, and expressive acts. As is methodologically consistent, 
Husserl always confines himself to beginning with the “simplest possible” case. He 
thereby begins with the phenomena of “naming”. He begins with a singular example of 
naming his own inkpot; his purpose is to fully describe a singular example of “a 
relationship of static union, where a sense-giving thought has based itself on intuition, 
and is thereby related to its object.” He describes, as an example of this phenomenon, “I 
speak… of my inkpot, and my inkpot also stands before me: I see it.” What Husserl 
particularly wants to unravel or describe in greater detail is why in this case “the name 
seems to overlay the perceived object, to belong sensibly to it… The expression seems to 
be applied to the thing and to clothe it like a garment.” (LI, Pg. 291). 
Husserl’s analytic description discerns there are two independent acts at work in this 
seemingly simple individual act of naming - the perceptual act and the expressive act. It 
is not word and thing that enter into a relation but these two acts. However, he also 
describes that what mediates the relation between these two acts and brings them into 
unity is a third act termed recognition. It is because the act of recognition has the 
character of a classificatory act, and the expressive act is one with the classificatory act, 
and again because recognition of the perceived object is one with the act of perception, 
that the expression appears, so to speak, as laid upon the thing.79 
This far I have provided only examples of the description of the structure of individual 
examples of conscious experience. Although it begins at this level of description of 
individuals or singular experiences, demonstrated above, phenomenology seeks to move 
to a more universal or eidetic level of description. Eidetic description proceeds from the 
individual to a descriptions of species that the individual belongs to, in order to see if the 
same structures remain. However, the description of the species is methodologically 
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based on the initial description of the individual; no adequate insight into general 
essences is possible without backing by specific individual actual examples as their 
intuitive foundation.80 This point is critical for the proceeding discussions.  
In the Logical Investigations Husserl proceeds, directly after the individual example of 
naming his inkpot, to show that, not only in this case, but that “in all cases where a 
name is applied intuitively to a thing” that the same relations between the acts outlined 
above remains. As the aim of this level of description is to move to a universal or eidetic 
level Husserl begins with a universal example. He begins with the example of the name 
red. However he does not mean the name red singularly and actually applied (in the way 
that he has just named his “inkpot”) but universally applied; as it is applied to all objects 
which deserve the name. This step thus involves some level of universalization via 
imaginative reconstruction; Husserl is asking us to go further than the instances of 
naming red as moments of the objects in our perceptual field and beyond, and imagine 
the name red applied universally.  
Husserl describes the same structural relation between the individual example and this 
universal level when he writes that  
“What here lies before us can be naturally described, with equal correctness, by 
saying that the name 'red' calls the object red, or that the red object is 
recognized (known) as red, and called 'red' as a result of this recognition. To 'call 
something red' – in the fully actual sense of 'calling' which presupposes an 
underlying intuition of the thing so called – and to 'recognize something as red', 
are in reality synonymous expressions” (LI, Pg. 293).  
Methodologically, the level of description of individuals is associated with the 
transcendental reduction. The level of eidetic description is associated with the eidetic 
reduction. “We intend any descriptions we make to be valid for more cases than simply 
the one we are involved with at the moment. The way we get to such general validity is 
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through the eidetic reduction.”81 With the eidetic reduction we must move from the 
description of particular “actual” or “real” instances to description which involves 
“fantasy”. The aim of this step in the method is to discern invariant or essential 
structures that pertain to a particular species of experience. Practically this means 
repetitively going over many different examples of the particular type of experience we 
are describing in order to discern essential or invariant levels of structure. Husserl 
termed this process free variation in fantasy.  
In free variation in fantasy, as it is involved with the determining of essences,82 “what 
usually happens is that the writer… will project a single imaginative variant, but one that 
is strategic, crucial, and usually colourful, one that brings out a certain necessity in the 
thing we wish to examine.”83 For example the cube in Thing and Space. This example 
demonstrates many of the eidetic features of Husserl’s theory of perception. As Husserl 
writes, as concerns discerning the eidetic structures of experience, free fancy assumes 
“a privileged position over against perceptions, and that, even in the phenomenology of 
perception itself” (Ideas 1, Pg. 136).  
Husserl states essences are “…disclosed by way of example, but one which is ideally 
possible, conceived in unconditioned universality” (PP, Pg. 28). “It’s not easy to capture 
the right imaginative variant, to pick out the dramatic, vivid example that shows a 
necessity.”84 As Husserl puts it, it will forever be a point “for lovers of paradox” that we 
need fantasy to gain eidetic insight (Ideas 1, Pg. 136), that “fantasy is the element for 
philosophical insight.”85 However, fantasy, as Husserl conceived it, has some very 
particular properties which make it ideal for the operation of ideation.   
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Fantasy is the species of mental acts Husserl refers to as “Phantasie”. This species falls 
under the broad genus of “objectivating acts”: an act which involves an intention 
towards an object, i.e. perception or judgement (most mental activity is objectivating). 
Husserl claimed that fantasy was a special modification of perception: that without 
perception there could be no fantasy. However, perception “presents” its object, 
presents it in a “lively fashion” (leibhaftigkeit) but fantasy, as it is a “re-presentation”, is 
not as lively.86  
Although fantasy representations are lower on the scale of liveliness in comparison to 
perception. Unlike perception fantasy is a “non-positing” objectivating act. Fantasy 
“suspends the thetic function”87 of mental acts; we are indifferent to the existence of the 
objects which are the intentional target of fantasy. Because the thetic function is 
suspended, fantasy is crucial in moving from actual examples to ideally possible, 
universally conditioned examples. Another feature, which will become critical in my 
discussion of descriptive method, is that, unlike memorial re-presentation, fantasy 
involves no “temporal distance or gap experienced, as there is in the case of memory”.88 
The experiences which we represent in fantasy, unlike memory, can be represented 
during any “moment of the now”, and they therefore potentially retain a strong 
“retentional trace”.  
In Thing and Space Husserl gives us one of his most enduring descriptive imaginative 
variants – a cube. As he observes, we might use an actual example, say of a cube, 
before us presented in perception but, in the end, the cube as presented in the “fantasy” 
will do just as well (T&S, Pg. 10).  Husserl uses various descriptions of a cube to ground 
his account of how we perceptually constitute a three dimensional object in space. For 
example, he describes the rotation of the cube. He observes that each square and its 
colour does not present itself in a single adumbration but as a gradation or manifold of 
adumbrations (T&S, pg. 85). When it first appears the square surface of the cube 
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appears, first as a vague line, then as a trapezoid.89 Husserl describes in rigorous detail 
how  
“The square surface first comes to proper appearance… as a slight indication 
within a rather unclear, “incomplete” presentation. The more the rotation 
proceeds, so much clearer becomes the presentation, so much more complete, 
and finally a high point is reached, in which the square “best” presents itself in 
this direction of change, such that further changes would again decrease the 
completeness of the presentation, progressing on again to slight indication and 
then to complete disappearance” (T&S, pg. 87).   
Descriptions like this are the basis for and demonstrate a wider range of descriptive 
claims about the phenomenon of perception of a spatial object such as a cube, i.e. that 
at any given moment only one aspect (or adumbration) of the object appears. An objects 
aspects has innumerable apparent shapes. When one perceives that the object is slowly 
rotating in its place, or when one moves around the object, other aspects begin to 
appear in a continuous flowing stream of presentations.90 Husserl’s example of a cube, 
closely described with numerous variations, proves rich and vivid enough to demonstrate 
many universal structures of his theory of perception. 
Husserl does not always walk us through the process of ideation, instead he often 
describes the results in what Reeder terms “reporting” or “summarizing” descriptions. 
For example, the following summarizing description makes eidetic claims about the 
nature of temporal conscious experience. 
“Every actually present now of consciousness… is subject to the law of 
modification. It changes into retention of retention and does so continuously. 
Accordingly, a fixed continuum of retention arises in such a way that each later 
point is retention for every earlier point. And each retention is already a 
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continuum… Thus a continuity of retentional modifications attaches itself to each 
of these retentions, and this continually itself is again an actually present point 
that is retentionally adumbrated.”91  
Thus far this chapter has sought to show that Husserlian phenomenological description 
begins with the description of singular actual experiences but that, in seeking to discern 
the eidetic structures of experience, it moves to the more universal level of description 
and here often involves free variation or the presentation of descriptive examples 
imaginatively in “fantasy”. In summary, we might consider the range from the singular 
to the universal as the vertical axis of Husserlian description.  
Husserlian description also ranges horizontally - from the noetic to the noematic poles of 
experience. This is because the intentionality which characterises conscious experience 
ranges between these poles. A noematic description describes the presentational forms 
of the object experienced; a noetic description describe what I and anyone must do in 
order to let the object appear (Sokolowski). Ultimately, building on these bi-directional 
descriptions, the “task of phenomenology is to explore the correlations between noemas 
and their corresponding noeses, the intentional activities that constitute the noemas and 
allow the things disclosed to be presented to us.”92  
Sokolowski provides an example of a noematically focused description. He is describing 
“the acoustic presentation of a sentence”. He specifically focuses on the dimensions of 
how the acoustic presentation of the sentence can and must present itself – its noematic 
dimensions. He states that, by excluding all transcendent relations, that it is the 
reduction which “turns objects into noemas”. He describes:  
“I must anticipate the end of the sentence as soon as I start the first parts of it. 
And although there is a continuum of sound and silence that extends through the 
utterance of the sentence, each word comes forward as a distinct, not a 
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continuous, part of the whole. Each of these words is such that it needs to hook 
onto other words and that it could have been replaced by another word.”93  
An example of noetically focused description can be found in Thing and Space. A 
fundamental tenet of Thing and Space is that the kinaesthetic activity of the perceiver 
plays a constitutive role in establishing the three dimensional experience of space which 
contains objects with identity over time. The kinaesthetic system is a noetic dimension of 
perceptual experience, thus Husserl’s descriptions of this system is an example of a 
noetically focused description. Ultimately, however, the following discussion will show 
how Husserlian description seeks to reveal the intentional correlation between the noetic 
kinaesthetic system and the sensory visual field. 
Husserl’s lengthy deliberations and descriptions concerning this topic (T&S, Pp. 143 – 
170) lead him to conclude that the relation between the kinaesthetic ocular motor 
system and the visual image field is non – essential, but that still a determinate relation 
pertains between a certain manifold of images and the corresponding certain manifold of 
kinaesthetic sensations when we engage in ocular motor movement. As Drummond 
summarizes, Husserl final (notational) description of the intentional correlation between 
the kinaesthetic ocular motor system and images in the visual field states that “within 
any given concrete perceptual situation, as the percipient actualizes a K-process, a 
determinate manifold of appearances is generated. Thus, the K-process K1-K2-K3-K4-Kn 
generates the connected manifold of appearances A1-A2-A3-A4-An.”94 
Thus, Husserlian description ranges vertically, from the description of the structures of 
precise examples of actual or “real” lived experience, to the description of the eideitic or 
universal structures of experience. However, it might also be characterised as ranging 
laterally or horizontally. That is – it describes the noetic and noematic dimensions of 
experience, and the intentional relation that pertains between them. 
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The next half of this chapter will explore the methodological preparation involved in 
Husserlian description. Description is not the initial gesture in Husserl’s 
phenomenological method. Even at the level of the individual it is preceded by two 
preparatory steps – intuiting and analyzing. Husserl states that “description refers back 
to intuition.” (PP, Pg. 48) In Husserl the reader is invited to read every finding therein 
described as they read “a zoological or a botanical description, with reference to the 
object itself, and consequently as an expression of something seen which can only be 
understood by means of direct intuition.”95 
For Husserl intuition means directly or immediately experiencing the actual structures 
and forms he wants to describe. Intuitional experience has “the character of 
immediacy”.96 Hintinka puts it pithily that an “expression like “immediate intuitive truth” 
is for Husserl a pleonasm.”97 Certain types of experiences are naturally given with a high 
degree of what Husserl terms intuitive “fullness”. “The work of intuition… contributes to 
the intended act, when authentically fulfilled, a genuinely novel element, to which the 
name ‘fullness’ may be given”.98 We can distinguish in any act involving intuition 
“degrees of extension, vividness and reality”. These three axes serve to determine the 
intuitive fullness of a given object. The more characteristics or features of an object we 
are aware of, the more we are aware of the objects extension. The more sensate content 
the higher the reality. Lastly the extent to which our thinking of the object is analogous 
to the object itself then the more vivid our intuitions will be.99 The greater the extent of 
fullness with which objects are initially given to intuition, then the richer our descriptions 
can be.  
A prototypical type of intuitive act is acts of perception of sensate objects, “which is a 
privileged intuitive act – a primary intuition.” This is because the characteristic property 
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of perceptual acts is that it gives its object with a high degree of liveliness; in the “”in 
flesh and bones”” (Leibhaftigegeben).100 Furthermore, the most intuitively full act is an 
act of reflection.  
In reflection consciousness takes itself as its object. Reflection is characterised as an 
internal, immanent type of intuition and it is “privileged” even with respect to perception 
in that it achieves the highest level of fullness. For Husserl not only description but the 
entire phenomenological method moves almost exclusively among acts of reflection. The 
perception of consciousness, which Husserl calls reflection, “is a direct vision of 
something which is given… in perception as something absolute…”.101 Unlike the 
perception of external things (which is always given in a series of adumbrations of 
profiles), immanent perception can in principle be given “adequately” (This thesis will 
discuss, in the final chapter, the notion of adequate evidence).  
Husserl states that when reflective perception is directed towards consciousness “what is 
perceived is an absolute self, the existence of which cannot, in principle, be denied; that 
is, it is in principle impossible to suppose that it does not exist.” To say of a reflective 
perception “given in such a way that it does not exist would be nonsense.”102 Thus, the 
intuitively full reflection on immanent consciousness, which forms the basis of Husserl’s 
method, brings with it a degree of apodicticity.  
This essay has briefly outlined the analytic component inherent in Husserlian description 
earlier. What I want to draw out here is the relation between the three fundamental 
methodical components of intuition, analyzing and description. What I personally had 
often found most perplexing about the method is precisely when to move from intuitive 
experience to analysis and description. The problem is we can’t have the intuitive 
experience and analyse and describe it simultaneously. Our experiences are directed; we 
are engaged by them. Analysis implies some degree of reflection and reflection takes 
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time; involves a change in direction. We can’t have an experience and analyse or 
describe it simultaneously because our experience changes fundamentally as we engage 
in analysis and description. It seems as “though the structure of the reflexive 
transformation most usually assumes the form of a constitutive recapitulation” which is 
non-contemporaneous with the experience itself.103 
Regarding the relation between intuiting and describing in particular, as Petitmengin-
Peugeot  found when trying to train people in the method of phenomenological 
description, it is difficult, if not impossible, to live out an intuitive experience and 
simultaneously put it into words. Instead, we tend to vacillate between successions of 
periods of time in which the person silently relives an aspect of the experience, and of 
periods in which they describe the corresponding experience while they retain an 
“interior ‘trace’.” 104 My problem has always been that, if all of the above is true, then 
doesn’t that mean that our analyses and description will always be of memories of 
experience? As soon as I stop having the experience and move into analysis or 
description the experience has stopped; it is now a memory and any analysis I carry out 
will be of this memory. What exactly is involved in the above mentioned “interior 
‘trace’”?  
The solutions to this problem lies in two directions. The first is an understanding of the 
Husserlian framework on the consciousness of internal time and the pivotal 
phenomenological notion of retention – especially as opposed to the concept of memory. 
Memory is episodic and poses a duality with experience. In contrast retention “is the 
presence in the present, the “now”, of the just – past.”105  
Retention is both a descriptive feature of consciousness and makes phenomenological 
description possible.106 Retention forms a continuous unity between current temporal 
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experience and past temporal experience. Phenomenology is not confined to the realm of 
memory; it has the entire sphere of experiences “held” in retention. This also illuminates 
why Husserlian description at the level of the individual often focuses on perception. 
Perceptual experience is continual as long as we are conscious and it thus presents itself 
closely constantly in retention, unlike other more fleeting conscious phenomenon like, 
say, anger. Anger, “reflected upon may dissipate, quickly modifying its content. It is not 
always available like perception”. (Ideas 1, Pg. 135).  
As I have mentioned, fantasy is not as “lively” (or, intuitively full) as perception, 
although ideation in fantasy is (also as I have mentioned) based on prior individual 
examples which are given with a high degree of liveliness. Fantasy is also not given as 
continually as perception is, but still, particularly for the process of eidetic variation, it is 
continually available or accessible as a representative experiential mode. As a mode of 
thought it thus offers a strong retentional trace. This makes it invaluable for Husserl’s 
method. 
Husserl coins a particular term for this “holding” or “grasping” of intuitional experience in 
retention for the purpose of analysis and description – Nachgewahren. Schmikking 
explains that what        
“Husserl calls Nachgewahren is part and parcel of description, or rather of the 
descriptive phase which Spiegelberg aptly calls ‘analysis’. The term 
Nachgewahren refers to the grasping of a lived experience immediately after the 
experience itself, i.e., while the… episode is still given in retention. 
Phenomenologists need to habitualize their interest in their subject matters 
(types of objects and correlative experiences). During performing everyday tasks, 
skills, etc. in the natural attitude the latent interest awakes immediately after 
certain experiences, acts, etc. In this way experience or worldly comportment can 
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be analyzed without distortions, thereby avoiding the paradox of self-
observation...”107  
Correspondingly, at the level of the species and the universal, Husserl emphasises the 
intuition of essences which he refers to as the process of “wesensschau” – “essence 
viewing” or eidetic intuition. “Husserl claims that, besides seeing particular things and 
events in sensuous perception, we can see essences through a non-sensuous intuition 
that is founded on sensuous perception and is analogous with it.”108 The analogy 
between intuition of perceptual and abstract objects results because in both cases we do 
not speak or think about the object in an absent, empty way but the object is present 
and given to us, and plays a role in knowledge.109  
Thus, to summarise this section, certain key details have emerged regarding Husserlian 
description. It is intimately tied with intuitive acts, of which perception is a key example. 
However, the most intuitive type of act is acts of immanent perception; reflective acts. 
Husserlian description requires the holding or grasping of experience in retention. 
Perception, because it is constant and therefore “highly” retentional, is an ideal 
candidate for description. At the eidetic level fantasy, because it is constantly accessible 
or available, also retains a strong retentional trace, which makes it invaluable for 
Husserlian description. The universal or essential level of description requires the non-
thetic representations of objects in fantasy for eidetic variation and the grasping or 
seeing of essences in an act Husserl terms wesensschau. This is some of the 
“methodological hardtack” that comes with a proper characterisation of Husserlian 
phenomenological description. 
The final part to this chapter will discuss the particularly distinctive language of 
Husserlian phenomenological description. Husserl uses a wide, specialized vocabulary. 
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Even in his descriptions of singulars given above, terms like intentionality, universal and 
essence, intuition, free variation, parts and wholes, etc. have specific meanings in 
Husserlian phenomenology, due often to Husserl’s continual refinement and redefinition 
of terms commonly featured in the recent history of philosophy. This is a hurdle for 
researchers approaching his phenomenology. However, this hurdle hides one of the 
deeper interpretive problems for readers of Husserl’s descriptive phenomenology, which 
I would term the creative nature of Husserlian description.  
This creative nature springs, firstly, from the morphological nature of descriptive 
language and concepts. As Husserl states, there is a certain vagueness to the 
terminology a descriptive scientist (natural or phenomenological) must use. By 
vagueness Husserl means the terms are widely applicable and not domain specific. The 
descriptive practitioner develops morphological concepts which are expressed with terms 
like “notched, indented, lens-shaped, umbelliform, and the like— simple concepts which 
are essentially and not accidentally inexact”. For Husserl morphological concepts 
“express the essential nature of things as drawn directly from simple intuition” (Ideas 1, 
Pg 142). 
The vagueness of morphological descriptive concepts partly accounts for the creative 
nature of Husserlian phenomenological description. Husserl draws on considerable 
linguistic resources in his attempts to faithfully portray structural features of conscious 
experience – “the moment of the now, retention and protention” or “adumbration and 
profile”, etc. are examples of phenomenological morphological descriptive terms and 
concepts which Husserl himself has had to coin and develop specifically for the practice 
of his phenomenological description. Also, due to its interminably vague nature, there is 
nothing that precludes continual further clarification and specification resulting in the 
continual construction and development of new morphological terms and concepts in the 
process of description. Morphological description is linguistically “generative”.  
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Relatedly, the second contributing factor to the creativity of Husserlian description is its 
iterative or recursive nature. Husserl described his phenomenological enterprise as an 
endless process of corrections.   
“The few works that he published in his lifetime look like “purely momentary 
states of rest, or ‘condensations’ of a thought movement that was constantly in 
flux” (Bernet, Kern & Marbach, p. 2)... Husserl’s thought on core 
phenomenological notions never stood still; he was, in his own memorable image, 
“an endless beginner”, and would be the first to open a new path when the woods 
became lost in the trees.”110  
We see the recursive nature of Husserl’s method expressed in his descriptions in two 
ways. The first is the way Husserl returns again and again to identical themes – themes 
like the ego, intersubjectivity, phenomenological space and time – throughout the course 
of his lifetime. Each time Husserl reapproaches a theme he is searching for intrinsically 
earlier points in the order of reason. His terminology and position is subject to continual 
refinement in most areas of his phenomenological research. The iterative nature of 
Husserl’s work is because, as he explains, reflection has “very many levels and depth 
dimensions”; reflection, or, internal experience, is a “process of disclosure to be effected 
in ever new reflection” (PP, Pg. 21). Each new level or dimension of depth requires re-
analysis and re-description. The “cross of corrections” which Husserl bears demands that 
a “conclusive, true actuality must come to light ever more purely, ever more 
completely.” (PP, Pg. 95) 
Phenomenological description “grasps the continuous development” of phenomenological 
science. “Description is in fact the immediate experiencing of this development.” 
Ultimately, the telos of all scientific activity is the continual clarification and definition of 
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the respective objects of study.111 For Husserl the iterative and endless nature of 
description results because of phenomenology’s aim to realise the initial impetus that 
underlies all scientific activity. 
Husserl’s memoirs reveal that he spent a great deal of time in his daily meditations, 
interrupting them to write. “The process of daily meditation on a particular theme 
involved this resolute carrying forward of a train of thought, reaching an impasse, 
backing up, and then going forward again – a cycle of “endless corrections and revisions” 
repeated again and again…”112 In this way a “thorough consciousness of one and the 
same world comes into being through revisions and corrections” (ACPAS, Pg. 143).    
Thus, the practice of Husserlian description involves a lengthy, meditative, recursive 
process on a phenomenological theme. This process entails some of the methodical 
apparatus I have outlined. Husserl will not always “walk us through” this process; it is 
expressed, for example in the summarizing descriptions I have outlined above. As 
Reeder notes these sort of descriptions represent a sustained attempt to return to and 
describe a specific theme repetitively over time.113 These reports are a distillation of 
several descriptions which have been gathered and compared, often internally by 
Husserl, over time.  
However, the organisation of Husserl’s “meditatively styled” works (such as Thing and 
Space and the Cartesian Mediations) gives the reader the impression that Husserl is 
walking or guiding us through this recursive process. Husserl characterised the recursive 
or “zig-zag” style of reasoning as the most secure (LI, Pg. 261). Recursive reasoning 
involves returning to that which is most obscure and wrestling with that until the 
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problem has been clarified. “Digging in that which is most obscure and of uncovering 
problems which have not been seen or if seen have not been solved.”114     
In conclusion to this section, Husserlian description is in fact creative in nature, and this 
is partly accounted for by the morphological nature of phenomenological descriptive 
terms and concepts. Also, both the practical and linguistic aspects of the nature of 
Husserlian description entails a lengthy and potentially endless process of continual 
clarification and re-clarification of phenomenological themes. This also accounts for the 
creative nature of Husserlian description. 
In conclusion, my characterisation of Husserlian description has had five major parts. In 
the first part I defined Husserlian description as a description of the structures of 
conscious experience. The second and third parts discussed that it ranges from the 
singular to the universal, and from the noetic to the noematic poles. In the fourth part I 
detailed some necessary methodological components which cannot be untied from 
description. Lastly, I have detailed that description is creative: the language of 
description is morphological and the process of description is recursive.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
114 Dorion Carins quoted in MacDonald, P. (2000) Descartes and Husserl, The Project of Radical Beginnings. State University 
of New York Press: Albany. Pg. 86.  
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Chapter 4.  
Husserlian phenomenology and simulation: assessment of the phenomenology of 
simulation and future directions for phenomenological research in intersubjectivity. 
The final chapter of my thesis will discuss Husserlian description and the current debate 
between interaction theory and simulation theory over the question of the nature and 
extent of personal level processes in intersubjective experience. I will first outline that 
the existing accounts of simulation which resemble a phenomenological description are 
inadequate and that furthermore the one existing account of the phenomenology of 
mirror neurons, provided by Dieter Lohmar, already begins to raise questions for 
simulation theory 
The second section of this chapter will address the claim that Husserlian phenomenology 
is not in a position to provide descriptions of intersubjectivity because of its inherently 
solipsistic nature. I will counter this claim by providing Husserl’s mature position of 
monadological intersubjectivity. I will detail Husserl’s notions of pairing and the resulting 
apperceptive transfer of sense and suggest advocates of simulation theory might do well 
to look into these analyses.  
In the third section to this chapter I will assess the claim made by Gallagher that we find 
no phenomenological evidence for simulation theory. I will conclude this claim has been 
made pre-emptively. I will also suggest that, if simulation theory is to seriously engage 
with phenomenology and meet the ensuing challenges from other theories with 
phenomenological argument, it will need to reorientate itself methodically and contend 
with the concern of what counts as evidence in support of a theory. My central claim in 
this concluding chapter is that the debate between simulationists and interactionists 
needs to engage with Husserlian phenomenology if it is to proceed over the problem of 
the extent and nature of personal level processing. The final section to this chapter will 
summarise this argument.  
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As I mentioned in the second chapter of this thesis there is, in Goldman’s historical 
introduction to simulation theory, the closest account thus far of a phenomenological 
description of simulation. However, this account is essentially only a collection of literary 
and philosophical examples of descriptions of various social phenomena which resemble 
simulation. The closest example in this collection to a phenomenological description of 
simulation is the description given by Nicholas Humphrey in The Inner Eye. The quote 
which Goldman provides reads: “we could ... imagine what it's like to be [others], 
because we know what it's like to be ourselves.... [I] make sense of [others'] behavior 
by projecting what I know about my mind into them.”115  
Goldman states this account is given in the first person. Despite its brevity, there is 
another reason why this account doesn’t qualify as even the most cursory attempt to 
provide a phenomenological description of simulation which is evidenced in the full text 
from Humphrey: 
“Here is an analogy. I live in a house on Chalcot Square. All round the square are 
other similar houses, into most of which I've never been. But I have no trouble in 
"reading" what happens in those other houses on the basis of what I already 
know about my own. When for example I see smoke coming from the chimney 
over there I make sense of it terms of what I know of the fire in my own hearth; 
when I see a light go on in that window, I make sense of it in terms of what I 
know of the effect of flicking a light switch in my own room… Then why not the 
same with other people, whose minds I have never been inside? Why should I not 
make sense of their behaviour by projecting what I know about my mind into 
them.”116 
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As Sokolowski notes, good description might often use analogy.117 There is provisionally 
no such reason why phenomenological description can’t do so but by itself an analogy, 
followed by a rhetorical question and statement, is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
phenomenological description. Of course, neither Goldman nor Humphreys are 
attempting to provide a phenomenological description of simulation, these accounts are 
only the closest I’ve been able to find in the simulation literature. 
There is, rather remarkably, a description of the phenomenological experiences 
correlated with mirror neuron activity. This account, provided by Dieter Lohmar, 
represents one of the few attempts to describe concrete lived intersubjective experience 
in the contemporary literature. Lohmar’s work is an attempt to describe the 
phenomenological experiences which are speculatively associated with mirror neuron 
activity.118 Lohmar states that “the fundamental conviction behind my analysis is that 
the performances of mirror neurons have an “internal view”, i.e. they can be experienced 
by me and those experiences are accessible to phenomenological description.”119    
Lohmar states that mirror neuron activity may be correlated with the intersubjective 
phenomena he terms co-experiencing. Lohmar describes, in true phenomenological 
fashion, this co-experience by way of a specific and concrete example:  
“if you see someone biting into a lemon, your own taste field becomes affected, 
you feel as if there was something sour in your mouth and react accordingly. We 
are co-experiencing a specific sour taste which is localized precisely in our mouth. 
The experience is confined to the sense-field of taste and it is simultaneous and 
coordinated with the other persons biting into the lemon.”120 
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119 Lohmar, D. (2006). Mirror neurons and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences Vol. 5 – 6. Pg. 6   
120 Ibid, Pg. 7. 
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Lohmar describes some of the features of the phenomena of co-experience, i.e. that co-
experiencing refers back to the ego and is not randomly directed. He states that when 
we are watching a film and the “bad guy” is beaten up by the “good guy” at the end, 
“then I do not feel with the bad guy. On the contrary, I like the fact that he is suffering”. 
This description demonstrates that a feature of co-experiencing is that it remains ““under 
the reign” of the ego.”121 
Lohmar also describes that sometimes co-experiencing comes attendant with co-acting. 
Lohmar describes how, when we are watching a movie which features a “cliffhanger” 
(where someone is dangling from a precipice of some sort), “there is a strong felt 
tendency to grasp something with our own hands. Sometimes our hands may unwillingly 
jerk, as if they were going to grasp and take hold.” Similarly, during the scene in 
Jurassic Park where a dinosaur snaps at the legs of an actor, the audience reacts by 
drawing back their own legs.122  
This preliminary phenomenological description already begins to raise questions for the 
phenomenology of simulation. Simulation is strictly defined as a co-experience in 
“offline” mode – that is, the actions of the other are experienced but not carried through 
or acted out on. That is, simulation is, by its own theoretical definition, never attendant 
with co-acting. However, Lohmar’s account of co-experiencing suggests an attendant 
phenomenological continuum which ranges between the strict “offline” or non-action 
mode to online mode where we partially mimic the perceived action. As a cinematic 
example of co-acting with co-experiencing we might recall a performance by Clint 
Eastwood in Million Dollar Baby. As Clint watches a boxer on television, he shifts his feet 
and weight striking with the boxer on the TV, writhing and wriggling with the boxer, 
moving with the blows, looking for leverage and angle in a similar fashion. Of course, 
even this end of the co-acting continuum in co-experiencing is not full blown mimicry 
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(Clint does not move and swing identically to the boxer on television) but a “shadow” or, 
as Lohmar terms it, a “weak” mode of co-acting.  
Given that Gallese’s theory of simulation depends on mirror neuron activity as its 
physiological substrate, if the phenomenological account provided by Lohmar truly is 
correlated with mirror neuron activity, then this phenomenological account suggests 
simulation theory will need to detail where it sits with regard to co-acting and probably 
even begin to incorporate cases of co-acting into its theory. Lohmar’s concluding 
remarks claim that “decisive progress” could be made through the continuing 
phenomenological description and analysis of phenomena associated with co-
experiencing, co-acting, co-willing, etc.123 
My thesis has focused on detailing what would be involved in using Husserlian 
description to settle some points of contention in the contemporary debate between 
simulationists and interactionists in the area of intersubjectivity. An objection might be 
put that phenomenology, especially as it was conceived by Husserl, is not in a position to 
provide descriptions of intersubjective lived experience. As recently as 1987 Dennett 
suggested that “traditional phenomenology is committed to a form of methodological 
solipsism; rather than investigating the mental life of others, the classical 
phenomenologist is concerned only with his or her own mental life…”124 Of course, 
Dennett doesn’t know what he’s talking about when he refers to what phenomenologists 
talk about.  
Dennett’s comment does reveal a complication for the practice of phenomenology 
regarding the description of intersubjective experience. Husserl himself was presciently 
aware of this problem, which he phrases, in the fifth Cartesian Meditation, as: “when I… 
reduce myself to my absolute transcendental ego by phenomenological epoché do I not 
become solus ipse; and do I not remain that, as long as I carry on a consistent self-
explication under the name phenomenology?” (CM, Pg. 89). Husserl’s initial response in 
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the fifth Cartesian Meditation is to withhold judgement on the question of the possibility 
of the phenomenological study of intersubjectivity.  Instead he proposes to “undertake 
the task of phenomenological explications… and carry it through in concrete work” (CM, 
Pg. 90) in the intersubjective sphere before coming to any conclusions.  
Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity begins with an account of the transcendental ego 
structures. However, ultimately, his goal is a description of the constitution of 
intersubjectivity for transcendentally reduced subjectivity and, founded on this, an 
investigation into the origins of intersubjectivity.125 Husserl argues that an encounter 
with the other and our ability to interact with and recognise another embodied subject as 
a foreign subjectivity, is pre-empted and made possible through the very structure of 
our own subjectivity. This structure is revealed with clarity through the reduction to and 
description of the “sphere of ownness” or the “primordial sphere”.126 
Husserl’s approach to the problem of intersubjectivity involves the prior stage of first 
providing “a definition and articulation of the primordial sphere” (CM, Pg. 108). Husserl’s 
methodologically “radical” approach to the phenomenological study of intersubjectivity 
provides the imperative to firstly “eliminate”, abstract or bracket consideration of the 
other in order to narrow the “phenomenological residuum” and examine the ego alone, 
in its “sphere of own-ness”. “We exclude from the thematic field everything now in 
question: we disregard all constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately or 
mediately to other subjectivity and delimit first of all the total nexus of that actual and 
potential intentionality in which the ego constitutes within himself a peculiar owness” 
(CM, Pg. 93). 
The purpose of this stage of reduction is to loosen or slacken the intentional ties that 
ground intersubjective experience in order to see them clearly. However, this is not 
equivalent to reducing the ego to a permanent state of solus ipse. The very nature of 
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meaningful experience presupposes intersubjectivity, “which can as a matter of fact 
never be suspended; that fact is genetically and causally prior to the level of the 
phenomenological method, and it is not altered by the adoption of that method.”127  
What is revealed or remains after this particular type of reduction is that which is 
peculiar to the ego in its concrete being. “That which is peculiar to my concrete being is 
my being as a “monad.””128 Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity is founded upon his 
account of the monadological structure of the reduced transcendental ego. Husserl’s 
account of the ego as monad represents his mature position on the ultimate stratum of 
the ego and forms an integral part of his phenomenological account of intersubjectivity. 
It also is an account which has been drastically undervalued in contemporary discussions 
of intersubjectivity and phenomenology within the debate I have been discussing.  
The notion that the transcendentally reduced ego in its sphere of ownness can be 
conceived of in terms of a monad refers, in short, “to the idea that the ego is a self - 
contained complex of being, that it has “no windows”, that it is an absolute self-founding 
origin.”129 Husserl’s monad is “the ego in its full concretion, i.e. the ego in the streaming 
multifariousness of its intentional life along with the objects meant in this life and 
constituted for this ego””;130 “the identical Ego-pole of my manifold “pure” subjective 
processes” (CM, Pg. 98). 
“Taken in its concretely complete nexus… subjectivity comprises what we call the 
concrete pure subjectivity or the monad; thus in this context, “monad” is not a 
metaphysical concept but the unity of the subjective within the phenomenological 
reduction, to be explored in direct intuition by painstaking analysis” (PP, Pg. 165). 
Conscious experience, conceived of as a monad, is the real nexus of phenomenological 
experience, which has no real parts or causal relations; but it does have an internal 
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makeup which requires complex description – though not a phenomenological 
description. 
After the sense of the primordial sphere as monad has been determined Husserl’s 
account of intersubjectivity can begin. The monad is the centre of intersubjective 
interaction and processes. As Leibniz argued before Husserl, – “every monad is a mirror 
of the universe; in other words, it contains within its nature a representation of the 
determinate relations that it has with other monads in its proximate environs.”131 For 
Husserl “the only conceivable manner in which others can have for me the sense or 
status as existent others… consists in their being constituted in me as others.”132 Husserl 
writes that “I have found that the reduction can be extended… into the other subjects 
appearing in external experience to me, the exploring I” (PP, Pg. 165). In this way 
Husserl thought his phenomenology capable of escaping the methodological solipsism he 
was aware it might be charged with and providing phenomenological description and 
analyses of the intersubjective sphere.  
However, this account of intersubjectivity is inextricably tied to Husserl’s conception of 
the ego as monad. Although the monad has “no windows” (that is, no real causal 
relations with objects in the world) it “mirrors” the world; in intersubjective situations 
the other is given to me as a mirror of my own embodied self; the other and I thus have 
a shared “sense”. There becomes constituted an ego, mirrored in my own ego, in my 
monad - an alter-ego. “The other … points to me myself; the other is a ‘mirroring’ of my 
own self and yet not a mirroring proper…”, for it is not exactly the same, not given in the 
same way (CM, p. 94). Husserl’s account of monadological intersubjectivity implies that 
intersubjective processes involve a mirroring of each monad in the other.  
Husserl asserts that this mirroring of the other involves a “pairing association” and a 
sharing or transfer of sense. Pairing is a “self-generating” process; a process of “passive 
synthesis”. Husserl argues that pairing occurs whenever two data are given intuitionally 
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and, although each datum is distinct, phenomenological similarity unites them. Pairing is 
consciousness of a likeness of two things: that they are the same kind. It is awareness 
of “likeness between one object and another co-intended object which nevertheless does 
not go so far as to identify them.”133  
“This ‘pairing association’ forms the basis for a quite natural transfer of sense, 
according to which the one is bestowed with the sense of other. Thereby a body 
which is similar to my own is ‘paired’, and the sense of being an ‘animate 
organism’ is transferred. This apperceptive transfer of sense give me reason to 
expect that the patterns of behaviour of the other to follow a discernable ‘law of 
motivation’, even if they are not entirely predictable.”134   
Thus, much like subpersonal simulation routines, the passive synthesis of monadalogical 
mirroring and the resulting apperceptive transfer of sense partly allow us to predict the 
patterns of behaviour of others. 
In conclusion, Husserl was aware that his methodical approach might become charged 
with solipsism. However, in response he provides his account of monadological 
intersubjectivity, and the closer analysis involving mirroring and the apperceptive 
transfer of sense. I think Husserl’s analysis opens up a rich field for simulationists to 
engage with. Many of the processes which Husserl outlines in his account of 
intersubjectivity could either be part of or replace parts of the simulation theory. 
Furthermore, Husserl’s account is soundly grounded in his method. To summarise the 
first half of this chapter, simulationists have not yet begun to describe simulation, nor 
have they engaged with Husserl’s mature analysis of intersubjectivity.  
The next section of this chapter will assess Gallagher’s claim that we find no 
phenomenological evidence for simulation. I will argue that this claim has been made 
pre-emptively. Something that has become clear through my discussion of Husserlian 
method is that, in describing even the basic level of an individual example of lived 
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experience, we can’t simply expect to turn to the experience in question and quickly gain 
a good description of it in a short length of time. Instead, phenomenology requires a 
sustained turning of direction and deepening of levels of reflection. The only way to 
begin to determine the phenomenology of intersubjectivity will be to repetitively or 
“recursively” return to attempting to provide descriptions of concrete intersubjective 
experience over a lengthy period of time. As yet, no such sustained attempt to 
phenomenologically describe simulation is evidenced in the literature.  
Gallagher goes as far as to term his argument against personal level simulation the 
“simple” phenomenological argument. He states that “when we reflect on our conscious 
experience when we encounter others”135 we do not find simulatory processes at work. 
However, something I have emphasised is the technical difficulties of Husserl’s reflective, 
descriptive method and the fact that the extent of levels of “depth” or dimensions of 
phenomenological description is practically an unanswered question. What “we” (that is, 
most of us) grasp in reflection is fairly shallow; not all reflection on experience is 
automatically phenomenological analysis.  
A technical reason for this is the difficulty involved in “grasping” experience in retention 
for the purpose of analysis and description. Unlike, say, perception, intersubjective 
experience is not continual whilst we are conscious of it unfolding. For this reason, 
perhaps, descriptions of intersubjectivity would be well fitted to representations in 
“fantasy” (for example, Lohmar’s filmic examples are a type of imaginative variation). 
Intersubjective modes of consciousness are more difficult to get a grasp on; it is 
considerably difficult to be in an intersubjective situation and to awaken the latent 
phenomenological interest or make the “switch” or change of direction which 
phenomenological reflection, description and analyses entails. Regardless of this 
difficulty, phenomenological investigations into the experiential aspect of intersubjective 
processes will need to begin here. Assessing Gallagher’s claim that we find no 
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experiential evidence for simulation would need to be based on a phenomenological 
investigation of the type I have outlined in this thesis, at the least in its broad outline. As 
no such investigation has occurred, Gallagher’s claim has been made pre-emptively.     
Gallagher states, as part of the simple phenomenological argument, that, on the 
phenomenological level, we are typically involved with interacting with others, and not 
attempting to predict their behaviour as simulation theorists would have it.136 However, 
this description is at a fairly shallow level. At this level there seems no reason why we 
can’t suggest we both interact with others and simultaneously run simulatory routines 
which help us “mind-read” and predict others behaviour.  For example, whilst in 
conversation with others I try to predict what they are thinking about what I am saying, 
perhaps by very fast, indistinct and partial (but nonetheless personal level) analogical 
routines. At the shallow level of analysis this proposition seems just as tenable as 
Gallagher’s to me.  
As Herschback notes, a reason the debate between theory-theory and simulation theory 
stalled was over the extent of personal level processing and the personal/ subpersonal 
divide.137 What is essential to the current debate is that the phenomenology needs to 
move from this simple or shallow level of description and engage with the technicalities 
of the method of Husserlian description. Or else, it may stall on the question of the 
extent and nature of personal level intersubjective phenomena, like other 
intersubjectivity debates before have done on this point.   
Lastly, something that has also become clear is that Husserlian phenomenology begins 
with the description of individual examples of actual lived experience. Thus, regarding 
simulation, phenomenological description of simulation needs to begin with descriptions 
of intersubjective situations that we have actually experienced. There is surprisingly little 
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attempt to describe lived experience going on in any discussion of intersubjectivity within 
the cognitive sciences, despite the resurgence of interest in phenomenology.138   
I think, from a phenomenological perspective, Gallese’s methodical approach to 
simulation is problematic. Gallese is, first and foremost, a neuroscientist. Although 
Gallese is primarily interested in the physical processes of the brain, he interprets or 
examines his empirical findings in the light of simulation theory. It is the engagement 
between empirical science and simulation theory which leads Gallese to appropriation or 
employment of phenomenological authors like Merleau-Ponty.  
The evidence which supports simulation theory is primarily and almost exclusively 
experimental evidence and neurological evidence – particularly research into the mirror 
neuron system. The notion of needing or providing phenomenological description of 
simulation has occurred only as an afterthought; the question of phenomenological 
evidence has been raised only because the distinction between personal and subpersonal 
processing, and the extent and relevance of personal level simulation, has become 
critical to the debate between simulation theory and interaction theory. It is at this point 
the debate turns to “The Phenomenology” for answers; it is only at this point that 
concrete description becomes called for.     
For Husserl what qualifies as evidence, and the process of developing a theory from that 
evidence, is not the same as Gallese’s. Husserl refers to inner evidence or self-evidence. 
Husserl states that we find self-evidence (Evidenz) wherever an intentional ray finds 
verification in a corresponding, fully accommodated intuitional percept (LI, Pg. 331). “For 
Husserl, evidence is the pre-eminent mode of intentionality in which the object we are 
conscious of is experienced as being itself there.”139 An account of Husserlian evidence 
would closely follow my discussion of intuition provided in the last chapter of this thesis 
(in Husserlian commentary the two themes are often discussed together).  
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Evidential acts are understood by Husserl to be acts in which the object in question is 
given with intuitive fullness. Husserl distinguishes between evidence, as objective 
confirmation of an epistemic claim, and evidenz as fulfilment of co-presented intention. 
Evidenz is provided by the fulfilling intuition of a positing intention. Furthermore, when 
the fulfilling intuition perfectly or completely fulfils its intention it is said to offer 
“adequate” evidence. Acts of reflection on conscious experience, because they are given 
immediately and not in ‘profiles’, can in principle be given adequately.140  
“But, the main point here is that each kind of evidence is… an immediate apprehension 
of the things themselves.”141 Husserl’s primary methodological directive, or his “principle 
of all principles”, is to never accept as true anything that is not derived from evidence as 
he characterises it. 
I claim that, if simulation theorists like Gallese are going to seriously engage with 
phenomenology, then a reclassification of exactly what sort of evidence supports 
simulation theory is necessary, one that orientates itself towards a phenomenological 
conception of evidence. This reorientation would have serious consequences for the 
conception of method, and ergo for the development of theory, for simulationists. The 
Husserlian method of description aims at indirect representation via linguistic 
communication of more or less adequate evidence. If we “find” phenomenological 
evidence, then an experienced phenomenological practitioner should be able to 
reproduce a rich, faithful description of the experience. Given the broadly 
phenomenological context of the debate between interaction theory and simulation 
theory, some more descriptions of actual lived intersubjective experiences would be the 
best place to begin the “meticulous philosophical work” that Gallese foreshadows. This 
provides a direction for future phenomenologically based research into simulation.    
Husserl’s phenomenology is, at least in its initial and descriptive phases, opposed to 
theorizing. Theoretical presuppositions are excluded from phenomenological description. 
                                                          
140 Russell, M. (2006) Husserl, A Guide For the Perplexed. Continuum: Hampshire. Pg. 103. 
141 Ibid. 
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However, phenomenology is by no means theory neutral. An aim of Husserl’s description 
and analyses is to discover the universal laws which govern conscious experience. But 
the point is precisely this: that the description and analysis precedes and leads to the 
construction of theory. Husserlian theory is grounded in or founded upon description and 
analyses, beginning with the description of concrete, actual lived experience, and the 
intuitional evidence provided therein. 
As many contemporary theorists point out, phenomenology cannot tell us anything about 
the subpersonal domain. However, this divide is conceived of in very different terms in 
Husserlian phenomenology. The personal domain is effectively the phenomenological 
domain – the entire domain of conscious experience which is to be intuited, analysed 
and described in ever increasing levels of detail and complexity.  
For Husserl what is typically subpersonal is constituted by the various processes of 
passive synthesis. The processes of passive synthesis are, however, available to 
phenomenological reflection and description. For modern cognitive science, as the quote 
from Dennett in the introductory essay to this thesis shows, subpersonal processes have 
been considered by some, very recently in the history of consciousness studies, the only 
processes which could constitute a psychological theory. Furthermore, they are defined 
as being completely directly inaccessible to conscious experience and analysis.  
Even the recent phenomenologically orientated authors like Gallese and Gallagher label 
many of the processes which comprise their theory “subpersonal” in this directly 
inaccessible sense. However, a phenomenological description “unfolds” or unpacks its 
object. It discloses and makes explicit the structures or  
“components, constituents, moments or whatever denotations one might prefer, 
which are involved in… conscious activity…, but which, prior to their being 
disengaged and disclosed, are effective only in an implicit fashion, silently, to 
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speak with Merleau-Ponty, or in an anonymous way, to use a Husserlian 
expression.”142  
Prior to the intuiting, analysing and description of conscious experience we are more or 
less in a state of unawareness regarding the constituents, depths and extent of the 
personal, phenomenological domain.  The entire purpose of Husserl’s method is to reveal 
the personal domain in ever new levels of clarity through reflection. Also, it seems to me 
like this prior state of unawareness is the one that the debate between simulation 
theory/interaction theory is stalled in. Unless either side spends more time working 
towards producing concrete phenomenological descriptions of our conscious experience 
of intersubjective phenomena, the very nature and extent of personal intersubjective 
phenomena, and the provision of phenomenological evidence for a theory of 
intersubjectivity, will remain forever illusive within this literature.  
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